Submission on Sexual Violence Legislation Bill 2019 by McDonald E
1 
 
Submission on Sexual Violence Legislation Bill 2019 
31 January 2020 
 
Submitter: Professor Elisabeth McDonald MNZM, University of Canterbury 
 
 
1 I am a law academic and legal researcher with 30 years’ experience, with particular 
expertise in relation to the law of evidence and the prosecution of sexual offences. I was 
involved in a FoRST funded project (with Jan Jordan) in 1994 – 1996 (which culminated in 
the 1996 DSAC conference “Ten Years’ On” in Wellington) and a Law Foundation funded 
project (with Jeremy Finn and Yvette Tinsley) in 2009 – 2011 (leading to the publication of 
From “Real Rape” to Real Justice (VUP, 2011) (cited as FRRTRJ), which included 
recommendations reflected in this Bill). From 1997 – 1999 I was Research and Policy 
Manager for the Evidence Reform Reference at the Law Commission, and have been a 
consultant in various capacities since then. I am the author of Principles of Evidence in 
Criminal Cases (Thomson Reuters, 2012), Mahoney on Evidence: Act and Analysis (with 
Scott Optican and others, Thomson Reuters, 2018) and Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence 
(on-line, edited by Simon France).  
 
2 I have just completed a four year research project (funded by the Royal Society Marsden 
Grant, the New Zealand Law Foundation, the Borrin Foundation and the University of 
Canterbury), which compared 30 adult rape cases with 10 cases from the Sexual Violence 
Court Pilot and makes 55 recommendations for changes to, or development of, law and 
practice. The research will be produced as an Open Access book and available from 26 
February: Elisabeth McDonald Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing 
adult rape trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury 
University Press, 2020) (cited as Rape Myths), with research and writing contributions 
from Paulette Benton-Greig, Sandra Dickson and Rachel Souness. (If of assistance, I will 
provide the Select Committee with a pre-launch copy of the book.) As part of the 
consultation process leading up to the publication, I ran two workshops in late August 
2019 (one in Auckland and one in Wellington) which allowed discussion concerning the 
draft proposals among a range of experienced practitioners. Those contributing included 
representatives from: the New Zealand Police; Crown Solicitors; Crown Law; the Criminal 
Bar Association; the New Zealand Law Society; the Ministry of Justice; MEDSAC; the 
Institute of Judicial Studies; Community Law Centres; universities; the support sector and 
victim advocates (including the Chief Victim’s Advisor’s Office, Louise Nicholas, HELP, Rape 
Crisis, Rape Prevention Education, Korowai Tumanako,  Te Puna Oranga – Kaupapa Māori).  
With my consent, some of the workshop attendees will be referring to the summary of 
the preliminary findings and draft proposals I distributed to them in August in their 









3 While I strongly support ongoing reform in this area, including the introduction of this Bill, 
I note that many of the proposed amendments come from recommendations that are 
now eight or more years’ old. Further change based on research and information (and 
public concern) that has emerged recently is required. I also believe that in some places 
the Bill does not deliver, in its current form, what was intended, due to drafting 
inaccuracies or potential interpretation issues. My submission addresses both these 
matters. 
 
Clause by clause commentary 
 
4 Clause 4: I support the change to the definition of communication assistance (see 
Recommendation 8.9 FRRTRJ). 
 
5 I support the extension of s 44 to civil proceedings, which the change to the definition of 
sexual case facilitates. I am not convinced that “issues in dispute of a sexual nature” will 
cover all appropriate cases (or rather, that this may be cause for argument). For example, 
when the case is not about sexual harassment (which would be caught), as opposed to 
when a person’s sexual experience is sought to be introduced as being relevant to their 
credibility or their behaviour at a particular time (which may not be).  It does not extend 
to other criminal cases, during which matters relating to the victim’s sexual experience or 
disposition may be at issue – such as the murder of Grace Millane – which will fall to be 
governed by ss 7 and 8. It may be a difficult drafting exercise not to cast the net too wide 
and create uncertainty. However, an amendment to s 6 of the Act (which guides 
interpretation) may be of broader assistance to judges making decisions about relevance 
in such cases. While s 6 refers to the fair trial rights of witnesses and parties – it says 
nothing about the rights specifically of victims who, if deceased or incapacitated, will not 
be either. It would be unlikely that the rights of confidentiality would trump the rights 
under NZBORA, but a specific reference to the rights of victims is something I think worthy 
of exploration.  
 
6 I am of the view that aspects of the definitions of sexual case complainant or propensity 
witness should be reconsidered. I am thinking of a situation where either of these 
potential witnesses will make a video recording pre-trial, but then become unavailable to 
be a witness at the time of the trial (death or incapacity etc.). This evidence will then 
become hearsay evidence and may well be admissible (as sufficiently reliable) – but should 
the definition be future-proofed in some way (so as to not only apply to witnesses)? 
Further, as currently drafted, the definition would include (for example) a police officer 
who may give propensity evidence about the defendant. So it does need some re-thinking 
– as I presume the idea is that the new provisions apply (only) to other alleged victims of 
the defendant (who are not complainants). I also suggest that s 95(1) is amended to use 
the final form of these definitions (and therefore include a bar on the personal cross-
examination of a propensity witness). 
 
7 Clause 7(1): If “one” is to replace “1” in this context (s 40), why include “1” in the definition 





8 Clause 8: I support the extension of the admissibility rule in (proposed) s 44(2) to the 
complainant’s sexual experience with the defendant (see Recommendation 8.11 FRRTRJ). 
However, I strongly disagree with the exclusion from the rule proposed in s 44(1)(a)(i). 
Such evidence (the “mere fact” evidence) will then only be subject to ss 7 and 8. My 
research suggests that the combination of these provisions do not sufficiently control the 
admission of evidence of the complainant’s sexual experience with the defendant (Rape 
Myths pp 186 – 196), so subjecting all information to the heightened relevance test is 
highly desirable. If, however, the “mere fact” evidence need only be sufficiently relevant 
to be admitted – what is the purpose of its admission? If it is to establish that the 
complainant and the defendant previously had a sexual relationship in the context of a 
rape allegation then the evidence must be relevant to something of consequence to the 
determination of the proceeding – so penetration or consent (including belief in consent) 
and perhaps (more on this later), credibility. The jury will need to be advised what the 
evidence is relevant to. If the “mere fact” evidence is offered as being relevant to consent 
then it is just the type of evidence that should be subject to proposed s 44(2), not just ss 
7 and 8. It would be unusual for “mere fact” evidence to be relevant to the issue of 
whether penetration occurred, but the risk is that the jury may make more of this 
evidence than appropriate unless a limited use warning is given. Finally, I am of the view 
(consistent with the purpose of s 44) that “mere fact” evidence should never be relevant 
to credibility – and even if, in unusual circumstances, it is, then the jury should again be 
directed as to limited use, which is a difficult proposition. Therefore, in my view, it makes 
no sense to single out “mere fact” evidence as being outside the rule. While there may be 
examples where the fact of a previous relationship explains why the complainant and 
defendant are in the same place, there is no reason not to subject even that information 
to a heightened relevance test in order to avoid the risk of illegitimate reasoning which 
the reform is supposed to address. Such an exception does not exist in any other 
jurisdiction of which I am aware. 
 
9 I also agree with extending the scope of a 44(1) to capture matters like the absence of 
sexual experience, recording sexual fantasies in a diary, possession of sex toys and the 
like. However, I am concerned that the addition of the phrase “the sexual disposition of 
the complainant” will not result in the intended outcome, and may give rise to much 
litigation. The term “disposition” is not defined in the Act and is only used in s 37(5) as 
part of the definition of veracity. Given that s 44 is referred to in s 40, and that the 
definition of propensity has received significant appellate attention, I suggest that the 
phrase should be something like: “the propensity of the complainant in sexual matters”. 
Whatever phrase or term is used should, in my view, be defined in s 4 or s 44 and be wide 
enough to capture evidence of (see Rape Myths p 148): 
 
1. the complainant’s sexual orientation; 
2. the complainant being in an intimate relationship with someone else at the time 
of the alleged offending; 
3. the number of pregnancies or children the complainant has had; 
4. the complainant’s use of or choices about contraception; 
5. the complainant’s possession or use of sex toys; 
6. the complainant’s propensity in sexual matters (or “sexual behaviour”) offered as 
relevant to the complainant’s credibility; 
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7. the complainant’s sexualised comments or photographs (for example, on social 
media); 
8. the complainant’s sexual behaviour with another person or the defendant 
(including flirting, kissing or close dancing) even when proximate in time to the 
alleged offending; 
9. the complainant’s having never previously behaved in a (relevant) sexual way; 
and, 
10. the complainant’s sexual behaviour with the defendant (including the fact that 
they were in an intimate relationship at the time of the alleged offending), except 
that which is part of the events in issue. 
 
10 Aside from issues around the drafting of s 44, I also recommend that admissibility 
decisions made pursuant to s 44 are always recorded/transcribed; and that directions as 
to the use of evidence admitted under s 44 are drafted and contained in a publicly 
available Bench Book. I also remain of the view (see Recommendation 8.11 FRRTRJ) that 
more guidance for determining relevance under proposed s 44(2) should be provided. This 
is included in s 44AA(5)(a) to an extent – could s 44 not be amended to make it clear that 
evidence of a complainant’s propensity in sexual matters/sexual experience is irrelevant 
to consent, reasonable belief in consent or the complainant’s credibility?  
 
11 With regard to proposed s 44AA, I consider that “reputation of the complainant in sexual 
matters” is broad enough to capture reputation about the complainant’s propensity in 
sexual matters (see above at [9]), unless this is seen as desirable for clarity. I am struggling 
to make sense of proposed s 44AA(5)(b) – the contents of what? What does “its” refer to? 
That they do really have that particular reputation? That would seem to run counter to s 
44AA(3). 
 
12 I agree with the amendment to s 44A. I do have concerns about the enforcement of the 
notice requirement and the impact on Crown preparation and appeal rights: see Rape 
Myths p 161. I suggest the removal of s 44A(7)(a) and (c) – the only exception should be 
that compliance was not possible. 
 
13 Clause 9: I agree with the message behind the change to the wording, but am unsure it 
will make a difference in practice. Appellate case law indicates the current section is 
viewed as codifying a duty. My research suggests that the implementation of the provision 
is not used effectively to prevent/control humiliating and belittling questions (content as 
opposed to form), so some more work on legislative guidance as to scope would be 
helpful: see Rape Myths pp 358 – 368. 
 
14 Clause 13: I disagree with the approach in the Bill of treating complainants in family 
violence cases differently from those in sexual cases. 
 
15 Clause 14: I consider that there are some real difficulties in practice with getting a pre-
trial recording process working effectively, despite being supportive of this option when 
it is preferred by the complainant. I suggest a model is first developed as part of the Pilot 
court in Auckland or Whāngārei. Rolling out these provisions before best practice (and 
appropriate facilities) are available will, I believe, result in unnecessary delays and poor 
use of court time – both counter to the intention of the reform. As currently drafted, I am 
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of the view that proposed s 106G(2)(c) will be the deciding inquiry. See further the 
discussion in Rape Myths, Recommendation 10. 
 
16 Section 106I(3) is at odds with s 106(4A). Both provisions cannot operate to control 
disclosure of the same video record. 
 
17 I support the introduction of s 106J (which based on the reform announcements made in 
July 2019 explicitly implements recording evidence at trial for use at a retrial; see also 
Recommendations 8.6 and 8.7 of FRRTRJ) but am concerned that a clearer statement of 
legislative intent is not flagged in the Explanatory Note to reflect the mandatory nature of 
s 106J(1). Just a query as to whether the regime in s 106I will cover such recordings, given 
the reference to “before trial” – wide enough? 
 
18 Clause 16: I support the drafting and use of counter-intuitive directions in sexual cases 
(especially those concerning adult complainants – see also Recommendation 8.17 of 
FRRTRJ) but wonder about the drafting of the proposed provision which requires the judge 
to give a direction when considered necessary or desirable to address any relevant 
misconception. This presumes that the judge will recognise that a misconception is being 
relied on or reinforced (and is not adequately addressed) and that it should be responded 
to by way of a direction. To be effective the implementation of the provision will need to 
be accompanied by training and development programmes to assist the judges’ ability to 
do this. Should it also be extended to self-directions in a judge-alone trial? I also consider 
that the words before “this section does not limit…” in s 126A (3) should be removed. A 
direction from a judge is different in nature from evidence offered by the parties, and this 
wording seems to encourage arguments about whether the misconception has been 
“addressed adequately” by evidence and trial tactics about how to ensure a direction is 
given (or not). Further, s 127 is not so limited. In my view if a direction is required, it should 
be given as the judge’s imprimatur regardless of any evidence offered by the parties.  
 
19 My research indicates that the list could be added to – and note that in none of the 40 
cases was counter-intuitive evidence offered (except for directions under s 127). 
Suggested additions are: 
 
1. the extent to which people who are sexually assaulted are unable to, or do not, 
physically resist the attack, due to the physiological and psychological impacts of 
the event (fight, freeze or (be)friend); 
2. the extent to which victims of sexual offending may (or may not) appear 
distressed after the alleged offending or when giving evidence, and that distress 
may manifest in varying ways, including in the form of anger or hostility; 
3. the fact that in the majority of cases no genital injuries occur; 
4. the fact that what victims were wearing at the time of the offending is not a 
contributor to sexual violence;  
5. the fact that time of reporting and alleged rape, choice of whom to report to, or 
incremental reporting, are not indicators of a lack of truthfulness or reliability; 
6. the forensic significance of post-event behaviour, such as contact with the 
defendant; and 




20 I also recommend the repeal of s 127, with the work it has done in the past to form part 
of the proposed directions to counter misconceptions. In brief, this is due to the limited 
scope of s 127 and the fact that it is not responsive to all of the challenges regarding time, 
content and recipient of complaint that occur at trial: Rape Myths at 219 and 405 ff. 
 
21 I also recommend the addition of other directions of significance in sexual cases, such as 
those related to inconsistencies, trauma and memory, as are employed in other 
jurisdictions: Rape Myths at 329 ff. 
 
22 The proposed s 127A directions should be given to the jury in writing, at the time they are 
given (as with a s 9 statement): Rape Myths Recommendation 37.  
 
23 Clause 24: I support the introduction of s 28B (see Recommendation 6.1 FRRTRJ) – should  
it also include reference to provision of communication assistance and support persons?  
 
24 I support the introduction of s 28C (see Recommendation 7.5 FRRTRJ) but ask the Select 
Committee to consider a specific reference to the provision of voice amplification for 
complainants. Our research indicates that many struggle to talk at the required volume 
(due to venue and content) and are often admonished for this: Rape Myths at 117. 
 
25 Clause 30: I support the proposed amendment but suggest additional direction, in both 
this provision and in s 199(1)(i), to the effect that the Judge should only permit a person 
to be present after ascertaining the views of the complainant: Rape Myths at 116. 
 
26 Clauses 31 and 32: I support the proposed amendment to ss 215 and 217 but query why 
other provisions in the Act of a procedural nature are not also included. For example, ss 
95, 103, 106A, 107 etc. 
Other related legislative recommendations 
27 I suggest s 88 is amended to control a larger range of evidence to protect a complainant’s 
privacy (see Rape Myths at 204ff):  
 
1. the occupation the complainant had at the time of the alleged offence and/or at 
the time of the trial; 
2. whether the complainant has (or had) no occupation or is (or was) unemployed 
or is (or was) a student, and in what course of study; 
3. whether the complainant is (or was) fully occupied caring for children or family 
members; 
4. the complainant’s school or tertiary qualifications. 
 
28 The recommendations in Rape Myths include reform and clarification of ss 128 and 128A 
of the Crimes Act 1961, which I note is on the Government’s longer-term work plan.  
 
